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vent “unwarranted human suffering” (p. 34). But this duty is wider than
the duty to prevent violations of dignity, for, Perry expressly says, some
forms of “unwarranted human suffering” do not violate human dignity.
How a moral system based on human dignity entails a duty to prevent
certain actions that do not violate that dignity Perry never explains. Arguments like this do much of the work in this part of the book.
As to the proper role of courts in protecting human rights, Perry argues
that unelected judges can protect such rights better than elected legislators or executive officers because judges are more insulated from popular
influence. This argument goes back at least to The Federalist. Perry then refers to the counter-majoritarian difficulty, the idea that judicial review is
suspect because allowing unelected judges the final say on the validity of
legislation is anti-democratic. He argues for a compromise solution that allows courts to invalidate legislation but also allows legislatures to overrule
courts by following special super-majoritarian procedures. Such compromises between unfettered democracy and judicial supremacy have been
discussed in the literature for many years, and Perry provides illuminating
accounts of the compromise systems in Canada and the United Kingdom.
Finally, Perry argues that when, as in the United States, courts have the
last word and amending the constitution is usually impracticable, courts
should declare legislation unconstitutional only if there is no reasonable
reading of the constitutional text under which such legislation would be
valid—a position famously developed by Thayer. Perry applies Thayerian
principles to conclude that the Supreme Court should find that capital punishment, laws banning abortions, and a state’s refusal to recognize samesex unions are all constitutional. Given Perry’s moral views on these issues,
this section of the book is an impressive display of intellectual integrity.
In sum, the problems that infect Perry’s use of the word “dignity”
ripple throughout his philosophical discussions in this book, and Perry’s
argument that religious theories have an advantage over non-religious
theories in supporting the morality of human rights is not persuasive. His
discussion of the law of human rights is stronger, however, and his explanations of various systems of judicial review will enlighten those who
have not kept up with the relevant literature. Especially for philosophers
not trained as lawyers but interested in the problems of translating moral
conclusions into legal norms, this is a valuable book.

Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics by Patrick Lee and
Robert P. George. Cambridge University Press, 2008; viii + 222 pp. Cloth,
$80.00.
DANIEL N. ROBINSON, Oxford University
In his attempt to “Newtonianize” what would now be called psychology,
Locke famously reduced the contents of mental life to corpuscular entities
(“simple ideas”) which, by a process of association, were melded into ever
more complex ensembles. The source of the elementary ideas was comparably elementary sensations. Locke’s related and further task was to rid
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a science of human understanding of every vestige of the old substancetheories still defended by the Cambridge Platonists just down the road. Of
course, the self (mind; soul; spirit) was just the sort of ontological dangler
that needed to be dispatched. Hence, Locke’s famous theory of personal
identity as but the reach of consciousness back over remembered experiences. If these could be transferred between a Prince and a cobbler, each
of them would awaken, as Locke put it, the same man but not the same
person. Along the way, Locke distinguished the things whose “essential”
nature could and could not be known; the distinction being between their
nominal and their real essence. The latter, in today’s vernacular, would be
at the level of sub-particles inaccessible to experience, whereas the former
would be classified by way of our merely conventional designations: man,
horse, Pippin apple.
Over time, it became clear that this seemingly abstract metaphysical
issue was alive with moral and legal conundrums. These were recognized
soon after the publication of Locke’s Essay. Pope, Swift, and the other
“Scriblerians” were quick to recognize the weird legal implications arising
from a theory that confers a new personal identity with new sets of experiences. But only in our own time have these anticipations ripened into serious and detailed examinations of just how personhood is to be understood
and the ethical and political consequences arising from different positions
on that fundamental question. Such a detailed examination is provided
by Patrick Lee and Robert George in six tightly argued chapters equally
informing in philosophy of mind, ethical theory, jurisprudence, and even
the metaphysics of identity relations.
Needless to say, in packing so much into a relatively brief treatise, the
authors are surely excused for summarizing, but not always analyzing, core
concepts at levels that would call for entire volumes. Thus, in considering at
some length Derek Parfit’s influential work in the matter of personal identity, insufficient attention is paid to Parfit’s interesting (but I believe flawed)
contention that the person-plus-self dyad enjoys no metaphysical advantage
over a person minus self entity. Parfit’s seemingly more economical ontology is thus not embarrassed by the consequences of a perfect duplication,
though Lee and George must rule against such a duplicate withdrawing
funds from the bank account of the original (p. 35). I should note that issues arising from this distinction are not reducible to dualism-materialism
controversies. To the extent that materialism can support some sort of personhood, it can equally well (poorly) support some sort of selfhood.
The authors provide an especially perspicuous account and critique of
hedonistic ethics, making good use of Aristotle in establishing that not everything desired is desirable. Variations on the “brain in a vat” scenario are
advanced in support of the claim that there is more to fulfillment than the
experience of pleasure. The research literature on intrinsic motivation is now
robust and reasonably stable and might have been consulted to drive home
the point that passive pleasures are quickly abandoned in favor of those we
work to earn. Even without this support, the authors set down just the challenges that hedonistic theorists ignore or systematically misunderstand.
The chapter on abortion begins with the arresting question, “What is
killed in an abortion?” The authors advance compelling, convincing arguments to the effect that human embryonic and fetal life is complete as
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an expression of human life, though not mature as a form of human life.
Obviously, the embryo is a complete organism (p. 121). The maturation leading to neonatal life is governed by processes internal to the embryo. Hard
cases (e.g., embryonic monozygotic twins) are seen to be rather soft cases
once the assumptions of the skeptic are examined closely. After all, as the
authors write, “In nature, determinate individuals split and generate new
entities all the time . . . ” (p. 123).
This part of the overall argument returns Lee and George to the conclusions reached in the first chapter. Suppose one contends that the human
fetus is a human being but not a human person, withholding the latter
until there is evidence of reflective consciousness, self-awareness, and so
on. On this account, there is a fetus that at a later date will be Mr. Smith,
but now is something qualified as “human” and “in being” and, therefore, in some sense a human being. Later, something new arrives – Mr.
Smith, a full-fledged person. As Lee and George make clear, only a very
quirky mereological gambit can make this seem credible. How one goes
about adding reflective consciousness to a (merely) biological system, the
latter now metamorphosing into a person, is the sort of theory that gave
alchemy a bad name.
The chapter on euthanasia, which includes considerations of suicide,
would have been improved by considering in detail Hume’s challenge
and then the Kantian perspective as a means by which to give moral solidity to the authors’ notion of “intrinsic dignity.” Such dignity as might be
accorded persons, at least on grounds not expressly religious, would seem
to be tied to the possibilities immanent in rationality itself; thus, to terminate rational life in the interest of a sensuous desire (termination of pain)
is, to say no more, a bad bargain. This, at any rate, is surely an argument
that might well have been developed in the chapter, even at the expense
of various conjectures regarding the (arguable) criteria of brain death and
the extent to which it should be dispositive.
The concluding chapter addresses the moral dimensions of sexuality
and does so with care and concern. The authors recognize the powers of
eros and understand that putting this aspect of life on the right track requires more than scolding. At the bottom of their analysis, the authors
caution against trading gold for brass. There is much more in the chapter, with an entire section devoted to distinguishing between heterosexual
and homosexual sexuality, the latter stripped of the moral validity associated with the possibility of procreation. On the offered analysis, only the
procreative heterosexuality that takes place between loving spouses can
“realize a common good rather than induce self-alienation or an illusory
experience” (p. 217).
Only an extraterrestrial would expect anything less than cries of protest once this book enters into the consciousness of today’s apologists.
It would be surprising if those opposed to the central arguments were
as respectful and systematic in their criticisms as Lee and George have
been in challenging views different from their own. But, as the title of
the work makes clear, what has long been an interesting if abstract set of
metaphysical questions has now been absorbed into the political realities
of our time, thus attracting many commentators foreign to philosophical
discourse. May the games begin!

